Behavioral Choice Under Certainty

Decision Making Under Certainty

Reference-Dependent Preferences

Individuals use as reference points:

  1. Other's choices/consumption
  2. Past “utility”
  3. Anticipated “utility”
    (i.e., what they expect, not expected utility theory)

Decoy Effect

Decoy Effect
A menu effect produced by adding an option that is clearly worse than one option but not clearly worse than the other. The added option—the decoy—is hardly ever chosen. Its job is to make the option that beats it look like the better deal.
Economist.com offers Price
Option 1Web subscription$59
Option 2Print subscription$125
Option 3Print + web subscription$125

Option 2 is the decoy: it costs the same as Option 3 and gives strictly less, so nobody should take it. Yet its presence makes Option 3 look like a bargain and pulls choices away from Option 1.

A Reference-Dependent Preferences Model

This model is a simplified version of Köszegi & Rabin (2006).

$$U(x,y\mid \underline x,\underline y)= u(x)+u(y)+\mu(u(x)-u(\underline x))+\mu(u(y)-u(\underline y)).$$

A Reference-Dependent Preferences Model

cont.

Loss Aversion

Let $u$ be either a utility for wealth or a gain-loss utility function. The point zero is either the initial wealth or the reference point, and we assume $u(0)=0$.

Definition
We say that $u$ displays loss aversion if and only if for any point $x\gt 0$, we have that $u(x)\lt -u(-x)$.
“What should I gain by the exaction of the forfeiture? A pound of man’s flesh, taken from a man, is not so estimable, profitable neither, as flesh of muttons, beefs, or goats.” — The Merchant of Venice, Act 1, Scene 3 (proposing the bond, weighing what a forfeiture would be worth)
“Thou stick’st a dagger in me: I shall never see my gold again. Fourscore ducats at a sitting! Fourscore ducats!” — The Merchant of Venice, Act 3, Scene 1 (with Tubal, on the ducats his daughter took)

The Loss-Gain Utility

The loss-gain utility is a component of the overall utility. Its utility/disutility depends on how the consumption-utility of a good differs from the consumption-utility of its reference level.

A loss-gain utility $\mu$ as defined above displays loss aversion if and only if $L\gt G\gt 0$.

The Endowment Effect

Endowment Effect
People demand more to give up an object than they would pay to acquire it: the willingness to accept exceeds the willingness to pay, $\mathrm{WTA}\gt\mathrm{WTP}$.

Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler (1990) ran markets in an economics class at Cornell. Half the students, chosen at random, received an object; the other half could buy one. Since the objects were assigned at random, half of those who value them most start without one, so standard theory predicts that half of the 22 objects change hands.

Market Predicted trades Observed trades
Induced-value tokenssupply meets demandwithin one trade
Coffee mugs ($6.00)114, 1, 2, 2
Ballpoint pens ($3.98)114 or 5

The median mug owner would not sell for less than $5.25, while the median buyer would not pay more than $2.25–$2.75. Median selling prices were about twice median buying prices.

A token is worth whatever the experimenter says it is worth; a mug is worth whatever its owner decides. The endowment effect shows up for the mugs and pens, not for the tokens.

Sellers, Choosers, and Buyers

Reluctance to sell or reluctance to buy?

Seventy-seven students at Simon Fraser University were randomly split into three groups and asked, at each price from $0.25 to $9.25, what they would do.

Group Decision at each price Median price
Sellersown a mug: sell it or keep it$7.12
Choosersno mug: take a mug or the money$3.12
Buyersno mug: buy one or keep the money$2.87

Sellers and Choosers face the same choice—leave with the mug or with the money—yet Choosers price the mug like Buyers. The low volume of trade comes from owners' reluctance to part with the mug, not from buyers' reluctance to part with cash.

Owning does not make the object more attractive: students given a pen did not rate pens as more attractive than the others did, yet 56% of them kept the pen over two chocolate bars, against 24% of those not given one.

“This suggests that the main effect of endowment is not to enhance the appeal of the good one owns, only the pain of giving it up.” — Kahneman, Knetsch & Thaler, “The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias”, JEP 5(1), 1991, p. 197

The Endowment Effect and Loss Aversion

WTA and WTP in the reference-dependent model

Let good $X$ be a mug, $x\in\set{0,1}$, and good $Y$ be money, with $u(y)=y$. Write $m=u(1)-u(0)\gt 0$ for the consumption utility of the mug.

Therefore $$\frac{\mathrm{WTA}}{\mathrm{WTP}}=\paren{\frac{1+L}{1+G}}^2\gt 1\iff L\gt G.$$

With the $\mu$ of the numerical example ($L=1$, $G=\tfrac12$), $\mathrm{WTA}/\mathrm{WTP}=\paren{2/\tfrac32}^2=\tfrac{16}{9}\approx 1.8$—close to the factor of about 2 in the mug markets. Without loss aversion ($L=G$) the gap vanishes: $\mathrm{WTA}=\mathrm{WTP}=m$. A Chooser gains either the mug or the money, so is indifferent at $p=m$, between the two—the same order as $\$2.87\lt\$3.12\lt\$7.12$.

Reference Points in Capuchin Monkeys

Chen, Lakshminarayanan & Santos (2006)

Capuchins who had learned to trade tokens for food chose between two experimenters. Each experimenter first showed some apple pieces, then took a token and gave apple pieces—sometimes more, sometimes fewer than shown. Each cell below reads pieces shown → pieces given.

Experiment E1 E2 E1 chosen
2. Gamble1 → 1 or 22 → 1 or 271%
3. Sure thing1 → 12 → 179%

Within each experiment the two experimenters deliver the same payoffs; only the display differs. Standard theory gives no reason to favor either one.

The displayed apple sets what the monkey expects—the third kind of reference point above—and getting less than that is coded as a loss. In the mug markets the reference is what one owns; here it is what one was shown.

“Given our capuchins’ inexperience with money and trade, these results suggest that loss aversion extends beyond humans and may be innate rather than learned.” — Chen, Lakshminarayanan & Santos, “How Basic Are Behavioral Biases?”, JPE 114(3), 2006, p. 517

Optimal Basket Choice

With Reference Dependent Preferences

The reference basket $r=(\bar x,\bar y)$ splits the good space into four regions. Click a region to reveal the reference-dependent consumer's $\mathrm{MRS}$ there.

MRS at (x, y)

Intermediary Micro Review

Finding the optimal basket

A consumer looks for the optimal basket $(x,y)$ on the budget line $p_X\,x+p_Y\,y=I$.

That happens in one of two ways:

A Numerical Example

Consider a traditional ($T$) consumer with utility $u_T(x,y)=\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y}$, a consumer ($R$) with reference dependent utility, $$u_R(x,y\mid 20,80)=\sqrt{x}+\sqrt{y}+\mu(\sqrt{x}-\sqrt{20})+\mu(\sqrt{y}-\sqrt{80}),$$ where:

We assume that both consumers' incomes are $I_T=I_R=120$ and prices initially are $p_X=2$ and $p_Y=1$.

At these prices, the optimal choice for these consumers is to choose the basket $(20,80)$, which (by chance) coincides with the reference basket of the $R$ consumer.

Now suppose the price of $X$ rises to $p_X=3$ (with $p_Y=1$ and $I=120$ unchanged), so the budget line pivots about its $Y$-intercept $(0,120)$.

The Traditional Consumer

Budget change from $A$ to $B$

Budget lines before ($2x+y=120$, solid) and after ($3x+y=120$, dashed) the price change, with the indifference curves through the initial basket $A=(20,80)$ and the final basket $B=(10,90)$.

Traditional consumer: budget lines and indifference curves through A and B

The Reference-Dependent Consumer

Budget change from $A$ to $B$

The same budget change. The indifference curves are kinked along the reference lines $x=\bar x$ and $y=\bar y$ (dotted). The consumer moves from $A=(20,80)$ to $B\approx(13.3,80)$, staying on the $y=\bar y$ kink line—$Y$ pinned at its reference level.

Reference-dependent consumer: kinked indifference curves and budget lines through A and B
← Readings Brain Biology →